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I. Introduction 
Cross-subsidies are often considered the principal mechanism1 through which hospitals 
provide otherwise unprofitable care (Phelps, 1986; Norton and Staiger, 1994; Banks et 
al., 1997; Banks et al., 1999; Horwitz, 2005; CBO, 2006; David and Helmchen, 2006, 
Vladeck 2006; Hseuh et al., 2009). Although there is clear evidence of regulation-driven 
cross-subsidization of otherwise unprofitable services in the transportation and 
telecommunications industries (Banks et al. 1999, Nicolas 1991; Chevalier, 2004), 
evidence of cross-subsidization in the hospital industry remains largely anecdotal and its 
extent is not well documented.   
 
Hospital cross-subsidization is not transparent from an accounting perspective, and 
therefore direct observation of this practice and its extent is not possible. Instead, 
identification must rely on shocks affecting only profitable services, such that their effect 
on unprofitable services can only be channeled through cross-subsidization.2  
 
In this paper, we use single-specialty hospitals’ entry in the market for select procedures 
as a shock that affects incumbent hospitals’ profits.3,4 Although single-specialty entrants 
                                                 
1 Other mechanisms include DSH payments, bailouts, uncompensated care pools, tax exemptions, and 
donations. We examine each of these in the Discussion section. 
 
2 Unprofitable care, also referred to as under- and uncompensated care, includes free or discounted care, 
bad debt, as well as shortfalls from Medicare, Medicaid and other public programs. While U.S. hospitals 
provide approximately $30 billion in unpaid care annually, the practice of financing unprofitable care is not 
well understood (Nicholson et al., 2000; Vladeck 2006). 
 
3 The federal law defines a specialty hospital as one that is “primarily engaged in the care and treatment of 
cardiac, orthopedic, or surgical patients” (MedPAC 2005), omitting from this definition psychiatric, and 
long-term acute hospitals that also are all single-specialty hospitals. 
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hospitals carefully consider their potential competitors’  provision of the contested 
services before entry, they are unlikely to consider explicitly the incumbents’ provision 
of uncontested and unprofitable services in particular (Burns, David and Helmchen, 
2011).  At the same time, unprofitable services offered by incumbent hospitals will be 
affected if they rely financially on the profitable services contested by the entrant. In 
short, we posit that entry into a specific set of profitable services directly affects 
incumbents’ profits but does not affect their provision of unprofitable services except 
through the shock to profits.         
 
The theoretical foundation for this argument is presented in Faulhaber (1975), who 
develops a model of pricing by regulated firms and shows that cross-subsidization in a 
free market would lead to competitive entry and result in instability of the cross-
subsidizing enterprise. This mechanism has not been investigated empirically in the 
hospital industry. Moreover, although the possibility of entry by specialty hospitals can 
challenge the financial resilience and mission-fulfillment capability of incumbent general 
hospitals, it is not clear if and how general hospitals reconfigure the scope, quantity and 
quality of their other, uncontested service lines in response to entry. Yet, the potential for 
adverse effects on general hospitals’ ability to cross-subsidize unprofitable care led 
Congress to institute a moratorium in November 2003 that halted the entry of new single-
specialty hospitals.5 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Reports by the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC) and the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) found conflicting results on the effect of entry by specialty hospitals on community 
hospitals’ revenues (MedPAC 2005, GAO 2003). 
 
5 While the moratorium ended in August 2006, no specialty hospitals entered the markets we study after 
this date. 
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The conditions for cross-subsidization across different service lines persist, in part 
because reimbursement for traditional Medicare and Medicaid admissions is based on 
non-market prices set by the Federal and state governments, respectively.  These price 
distortions persist to the extent that service lines remain profitable or unprofitable for a 
much longer period than in industries that face market prices.  As a result, cross-
subsidization would be possible in the hospital industry even if Medicare was the only 
payer.   Variability in the generosity of prices across service lines also occurs in the 
private market because prices will be a function of the ex-ante demand for services of 
insurers' beneficiaries (Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2003).  Insurers will pay a 
premium to ensure broad access for services that treat diagnoses that are more common 
and predictable in order to make their health plans more attractive to firms and their 
employees.     
 
Federal regulations also play a role in the persistence of profitable and unprofitable 
service lines.  The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) 
limits the ability of a hospital to discriminate among emergency patients based on ability 
to pay.  Under these rules, emergency patients must be stabilized before being discharged 
from the hospital or the emergency room, regardless of payer.  Thus service lines that 
tend to attract a large number of underinsured emergency patients tend to be less 
profitable, conditional upon a hospital's location.  No such restrictions are placed on 
elective or urgent care if the patient is otherwise stable and is not faced with imminent 
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death in the absence of treatment.  Thus, service lines for treatment that can be scheduled 
in advance lend themselves more easily for discrimination by insurers.   
 
Although entry by single-specialty hospitals is plausibly exogenous to incumbents’ 
provision of uncontested unprofitable services, the location of a new entrant within a 
market is not random.  A potential entrant will consider the prospective demand for its 
services in the context of the competitiveness of hospitals that supply contested services 
proximate to its potential location.  There may be unmeasured factors that lead a 
prospective entrant to choose one site over another. Unmeasured factors such as the 
availability of a suitable site is likely to only be indirectly correlated with the provision of 
uncontested services.  However, unmeasured factors, such as the efficiency of or 
physician morale at incumbent hospitals in the immediate vicinity of the entrant may be 
directly correlated with the provision of uncontested services.  We include an 
instrumental-variables specification that addresses these potential endogeneity concerns.  
 
We study the effect of entry by three specialty cardiac hospitals in Arizona on the 
provision of psychiatric, trauma, and substance-abuse care by incumbent general 
hospitals.6 These uncontested services are considered to be unprofitable (Horwitz, 2005; 
Vladeck 2006; Hseuh et al., 2009). We also test the effect of entry on incumbents’ 
provision of neurosurgery, an uncontested but profitable service (Lindrooth et al. 2011). 
The response by incumbent hospitals to a negative profitability shock allows us to study 
the reliance of select uncontested services on cross-subsidization. We chose to study 
                                                 
6 Tucson Heart Hospital entered Tucson in 1998 and was fully operational in 1999, Arizona Heart Hospital 
entered Phoenix in 2000; , and Banner Baywood Heart Hospital entered Mesa in 2003.  
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Arizona because entry occurred in two markets that are geographically well-delineated. 
In addition, entry was limited to cardiac specialty hospitals over a relatively short period 
of time, allowing us to use longer time series for the pre- and post-entry periods.  
 
We find evidence supporting system-level cross-subsidization of services considered 
unprofitable. In addition, we find evidence of hospital systems shifting into other services 
considered profitable in response to entry. These responses increase with the degree to 
which their contested services have been impacted.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: section II discusses our strategy for identifying cross-
subsidization. Section III presents the methodology used for measuring hospitals’ 
exposure to entry and its effect on provision of unprofitable services. Section IV 
describes the data. The results are discussed in Section V. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Identifying the effect of entry on the provision of unprofitable services 
Entry of specialty hospitals into profitable service lines has the potential of compromising 
the ability of incumbent general community hospitals to cross-subsidize unprofitable 
services (Schactman, 2005; Schneider et al., 2005; Berenson et al, 2006; Shneider et al., 
2007; Shneider et al., 2008; Tynan, 2009; Cassil, 2009; Al-Amin et al., 2010; Burns et 
al., 2010; Steinbuch, 2010).   Most stand-alone specialty hospitals are for-profit entities 
(Hadley and Zuckerman, 2005; Guterman, 2006)7 and many are at least partially owned 
                                                 
7 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services define a specialty hospital as either: (1) a hospital where 
more than two-thirds of Medicare inpatients fall into no more than two Major Diagnostic Categories, which 
encompass a range of similar Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs), or (2) a hospital where two thirds or more 
of Medicare claims are from surgical DRGs (McClellan, 2005). The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2003) identified nearly 100 stand-alone specialty hospitals in three major categories: cardiac (17 
hospitals), orthopedic (36), surgical (22). Women’s hospitals and other types of specialty hospitals made up 
the remainder. 
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by physicians (Cromwell et al., 2005; McClellan, 2005).8 They enter when they expect to 
make a profit and aim to attract patients suited for standard, low risk procedures that will 
maximize profitability, potentially leaving to incumbent hospitals disproportionately treat 
many high-risk patients with complex care requirements.9 Indeed, specialty hospitals 
have been found to be more profitable than general community hospitals when all payer 
types are considered (GAO 2003; Iglehart, 2005), in part because specialty hospitals treat 
a lower percentage of severely ill patients than community hospitals (GAO 2003; 
MedPAC 2005; Barro et al. 2005; Mitchell 2005; Cromwell et al. 2005; Greenwald et al. 
2006; Cram et al. 2005).  
 
Entry of additional treatment providers in the market for contested services should be 
welcomed by patients because greater competition will tend to lower prices, in the form 
of a reduced time price of reaching the nearest provider of these services and potentially 
even in the form of lower fees and health insurance premia. However, entry may 
adversely affect the provision of uncontested services if it compromises incumbent 
hospital systems’ ability to cross-subsidize less profitable or unprofitable services. For 
instance, cardiology and cardiovascular surgery diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) account 
for 25-40% of the average community hospital’s net revenue (Casalino et al., 2003); 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 Physician ownership of specialty hospitals poses a particular organizational and financial challenge for 
general hospitals that compete in the same market. Physician-owners have a stake in the clinical and 
financial performance of the hospital and are a major source of patient referrals. Cardiac specialty hospitals 
in particular have a higher percentage of physician ownership on average than other types of specialty 
hospitals. 
 
9 Specialty hospitals tend to be concentrated in states that lack certificate-of-need (CON) laws; all specialty 
hospitals are located in 28 states, with two-thirds located in just 7 states (GAO, 2003).  In addition, 
specialty hospitals tend to be located in high-growth metropolitan areas that lack a dominant community 
hospital, and that have a large, single-specialty physician practice group (Casalino et al., 2003). 
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entry by an aggressive competitor will put this revenue, and thus the incumbent’s overall 
financial viability, at risk. 
 
Current studies of incumbent hospitals’ exposure to entry compare markets that 
experienced entry to markets that did not.  A market-level measure does not take 
advantage of the considerable within-market variation in the substitutability of the new 
entrant's and the incumbent hospitals' contested service offerings.  Forward-looking 
potential entrants evaluate very carefully and strategically their likely prospects of 
success if they decide to start offering services in a given market and in a given location.  
Entrants will enter markets based on their prospects of success and thus, the markets and 
sites that new entrants select are not randomly chosen and may differ systematically from 
markets that are not selected for entry.  Moreover, some markets do not experience entry 
because incumbent hospitals succeed in deterring entry, for instance by allocating more 
resources to physicians attractive to single-specialty competitors (Burns, Walston et al. 
2001; Burns, Alexander, et al. 2001; Dafny 2005; Dobson and Randall 2005; Berenson et 
al., 2006; Burns, David and Helmchen 2011). In the latter case, entry by single-specialty 
competitors will raise the bargaining power of physicians providing contested services, as 
these groups may credibly threaten the incumbent hospitals with defecting to the entering 
specialty facilities. As entry deterrence is likely to claim resources from incumbent 
hospitals, a failure to distinguish between markets that are not entry targets and those that 
are may mask the true effect of entry on the provision of uncontested services by 
incumbent hospitals.  
 
 - 10 -
By contrast, we directly measure the degree to which an incumbent hospital's services are 
substitutes for the entrant’s.  This enables us to exploit within market variation in the 
exposure to entry and thereby increase the efficiency of our estimates.  Specifically, 
exposure to entry at incumbent hospitals is measured using the estimated change in 
medical and surgical discharges of contested services that is attributable to entry.  This 
measure of exposure takes into account the degree of service overlap and the physical 
location of the incumbent hospital vis-à-vis the entrant. Ceteris paribus the more closely 
prospective patients can substitute the contested service from the incumbent provider for 
the entering competitor, the more exposed the incumbent is to the negative profitability 
shock due to entry. 
 
We calculate the degree of exposure using the predictions from a logit demand model of 
a patient's choice of hospital. To this end, we calculated the predicted number of 
admissions with entry and then performed a counter-factual simulation to predict the 
number of admissions had entry not occurred. The difference between these two 
predictions provides an estimate of the change in cardiac admissions that are due to entry.    
We then sum the predicted change in admissions over all hospitals that are members of 
the same hospital system and create a dummy variable that equals one if the system-level 
change in admissions is greater than the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the predicted 
change, respectively.10   
 
                                                 
10 This dummy variable equals one for hospitals that are not in a system if the hospital-level change in 
admissions is greater than the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the predicted change among hospitals, 
respectively. 
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As many hospitals are part of multi-hospital systems, the relevant economic unit for the 
study of cross-subsidization is not obvious. There are good reasons to consider the system 
as the appropriate unit of analysis (Bazzoli et al. 2000, Dubbs et al. 2004). After all, 
financial viability is meaningful at the system level, as cross-subsidization can take place 
across hospitals within a system, especially when systems take advantage of scale 
economies by concentrating service lines in a subset of their hospitals. Similarly, the 
geographic location of hospitals within a system may allow internal subsidies, with 
hospitals in affluent suburban neighborhoods subsidizing underfunded inner-city 
hospitals. 
 
Hospital systems at the 25th percentile and above include hospitals that are the closest 
substitutes to the new entrant and are therefore most exposed to specialty entry. The 
substitutability with the entrant falls as we include hospitals in systems in the 50th and 
75th percentile of exposure.  We vary the cutoff for exposure as we do not know a priori 
which level of exposure represents a large enough shock to profits to affect the provision 
of uncontested services.  We then model the provision of uncontested services as a 
function of each exposure measure and other hospital and patient characteristics specific 
to each uncontested service. We focus on three uncontested services that are commonly 
thought to be unprofitable (psychiatric, trauma, and substance-abuse care) and on one 
service thought to be profitable (neurosurgery). 
 
We model the degree of impact based on the total number of admissions lost to the 
entrant.  This simplifies the analysis considerably and will not affect our results as long as 
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the affect of entry on a hospital or system's profits are a monotonic function of the 
admissions lost.  This is likely to be the case because a specialty hospital is unlikely to be 
able to discriminate among patients based on the incumbent hospital the patients would 
have been admitted to had it not entered.  In other words, our estimate of which 
incumbent hospitals are most impacted by entry will be affected because the specialty 
hospital will be just as likely to accept a desirable patient regardless of the patient's 
second choice of hospital11.  Similarly,  an estimate of the effect of entry on the private 
insurers price at incumbent hospitals will be proportional to the number of admissions 
lost to the entrant.             
 
As discussed above, entry by specialty hospitals is not random, as both the timing and 
location of entry are contingent on current and expected future developments in the 
market for the contested services, such as changes in reimbursement policies, patient 
demographics, physician availability, and medical technology.  The choice of market by 
specialty providers should be uncorrelated with developments in the market for the 
uncontested services.   
 
However, within markets, it may be the case that a specialty entrant locates close to 
incumbents that are most vulnerable to competition in order to maximize its future 
prospect for success.  For example, a site next to a poorly run incumbent hospital with 
discontent cardiologists will be relatively attractive to a new cardiac specialty hospital 
                                                 
11 Physicians that admit to both a specialty hospital and an incumbent hospital would be able to observe the 
insurer and be in a position to choose where a patient has a procedure.  The only way such an arrangement 
could affect our results is the unlikely case where the physician funneled unprofitable patients to the 
specialty hospital.  
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because it would be cheaper and easier to attract the cardiologists, and their patients, 
away from the incumbent hospital.12  To the extent that such bias exists, its direction is 
not clear. If the discontent of physicians with the incumbent hospital is not limited to 
cardiologists then physicians in uncontested specialties will also be more likely to leave 
the incumbent hospital.  In this case failure to address the endogeneity of the choice of 
entry site would bias the results in favor of cross-subsidization.  On the other hand, it may 
be that adjacent incumbent hospitals are poorly run and thus particularly vulnerable to 
competition.  A hospital may be inefficient to the extent that it does not have the 
management or systems in place to cross-subsidize, which would bias the results towards 
the null hypothesis of no cross-subsidization.    
 
Hospital fixed effects control for time invariant factors potentially related to the entry 
decision and the market for uncontested services.  However, time-varying hospital-
specific factors could potentially bias our results. We include an IV specification to 
address this possible source of bias.   We chose instruments that measure the cross-
sectional pre-entry susceptibility of a hospital to entry and the attractiveness of each 
hospital's catchment area to a potential specialty entrant.  The instruments are described 
in more detail below.   
 
III. Methods 
Uncontested services at hospitals with substantial service overlap with or in close 
geographic proximity to new entrants will be most exposed to entry.  Thus a difference-
                                                 
12 This example is based on informal communication with general and specialty hospital executives in the 
Phoenix, AZ market.  
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in-differences approach using a market-level indicator of entry will capture the net effect 
of entry but will not differentiate between decreases in uncontested services at exposed 
hospitals and increases in uncontested services at hospitals that are not exposed.   
 
We begin by describing our method for estimating each hospital system’s exposure to 
entry through its impact on contested services and then estimate how the effect of entry 
on the provision of uncontested services varies by exposure. 
 
Exposure is calculated using estimates of the effect of specialty hospital entry on the 
incumbent hospitals’ admissions of patients for the contested service.   First, the effect of 
entry on admissions at the incumbent hospital is estimated using the parameters of a logit 
demand model of hospital choice.  To ease computational burden, we estimate a grouped 
conditional logit model in which the data are aggregated to the zip code – diagnosis pair 
level (Guimarães, Figueirdo, and Woodward, 2003). Next, using the parameter estimates, 
we estimate the expected number of cardiac admissions in each year over the entire 
sample period at the system and hospital levels, denoted E(Admissionsstentry) and 
E(Admissionshtentry), respectively. The expected number of cardiac admissions at each 
hospital system if the specialty hospital had not entered the market is denoted 
E(Admissionsstno entry) and E(Admissionshtno entry), respectively.  The estimates without 
entry are derived by eliminating the specialty hospital as an option and re-normalizing the 
predicted probabilities so that they sum to one.  We use the same parameter estimates to 
calculate the number of admissions with and without entry.  For each system and 
hospital, the change in admissions resulting from entry at system s and hospital h is then 
calculated as:  
 - 15 -
 
(1)  Admissionsst  Admissionsstentry  Admissionsstno entry   
               
      Admissionsht  Admissionshtentry  Admissionshtno entry   
 
For the hospital that entered, E(Admissions No Entry) will equal zero.   
 We assume that an incumbent hospital will respond to entry only when 
Admissions.t is large enough to warrant the fixed costs of changing service offerings.  
We set Exposure.t equal to one if Admissions.t is greater than a response threshold, 
Admissions..Threshhold , and zero otherwise:  
 
Exposure.t 1    if Admissions.t  Admissions..Threshhold  
0. tExposure , otherwise  
 
Our measure of exposure relies on the well-known independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption that underlies multinomial logit demand models. In our 
context, this assumption maintains that the existence of a specialty hospital does not 
affect the desirability of one incumbent hospital versus another (i.e. the relative 
probability of visiting any two incumbent hospitals is unchanged, regardless of whether 
there was entry by a specialty hospital).  Thus the addition of a specialty hospital will 
leave unchanged patients’ relative probabilities of choosing incumbent hospitals.13   
                                                 
13 This assumption is reasonable in our specification because, as is described below, we stratified the 
sample by diagnosis and estimated the model for medical and for surgical admissions separately.  
Furthermore, within these diagnosis and procedure categories we interacted the clinical supply 
characteristics of each hospital with the clinical diagnosis characteristics of each patient and also control for 
travel time from the patient's zip code to each hospital in the choice set.  Patients reach each diagnosis 
node, not by choice, but by nature of their illness.  Clearly if specialty hospitals induce demand for more 
intensive services then our specification that limits the IIA assumption to within diagnosis cells would lead 
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Changes in the total number of admissions due to entry will affect both 
Admissions..Threshhold  and Admissionsht leaving Exposureht unchanged. For hospitals in 
systems Admissions..Threshhold  is based on the system-level exposure whereas the exposure 
of independent hospitals is measured using a threshold based on hospital-level exposure.   
 
Entry may also affect the prices that hospitals charge private payers for the contested 
service.  While we don't observe these prices, the effect of entry on prices could be 
approximated by calculating the value of a given hospital to an insurance network with 
and without entry (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003).  The resulting change in 
value would be proportional to the change in price within the market.  However, as this 
measure will be correlated with Admissionsht  , we would be unlikely to identify separate 
price and quantity effects in the analysis of the provision of uncontested services.  Thus, 
we make the simplifying assumption that the effect of entry on private prices is 
proportional to the change in the number of patients.       
 
We estimate the grouped conditional logit model separately for each market and 
separately for patients with medical and surgical cardiac diagnoses.  Medical admissions 
occur at more hospitals than surgical admissions reflecting the complexity of cardiac 
surgery.  In addition, admissions at specialty hospitals consist of a higher proportion of 
surgical admissions than at general hospitals.     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to higher estimates of exposure.  However, it would not affect our analysis of uncontested services because 
the system ranking of exposure would be unchanged.    
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To investigate the effect of using a market-level versus system-level measure of 
exposure, we estimate a generalized negative binomial regression of the number of 
admissions for each uncontested service with hospital fixed effects.14  The resulting 
parameter estimates are identified using difference-in-differences and we use robust 
standard errors with hospital level clustering (Bertrand, et al., 2004).  The estimates with 
the market-level measure of entry reflect the net effect of entry and identification requires 
the use of a comparison state to control for contemporaneous trends.   
 
We also measure the effect of exposure to entry on hospital market share, or equivalently, 
the probability a patient is admitted to an exposed hospital versus other hospitals in the 
patient's choice set.  Exposed hospitals can reduce the supply of unprofitable uncontested 
services by reducing the number of beds available for the services, shutting down 
dedicated units that target uncontested services, or limiting admitting privileges of 
physicians in uncontested specialties.  Closing beds reflects an additional cost for a 
patient admitted to an exposed hospital because his or her admission may be delayed due 
to capacity constraints.  The closure of a dedicated unit will also decrease the 
attractiveness of a hospital relative to its competitors and thus reduce the utility and 
likelihood of an admission at the exposed hospital. An additional mechanism lies in 
patients’ idiosyncratic valuation of a hospital.  As is common in hospital choice models, 
we assume that the attractiveness of individual physicians to the patient is encompassed 
in his valuation of a hospital's idiosyncratic attributes because a patient's choice of a 
                                                 
14 The hospital fixed effect are included directly in the model rather than integrated out of the likelihood 
function so as to mimic the difference in difference specification.  Specification tests revealed that the data 
exhibited over-dispersion and that the degree of over-dispersion was a function of the market and a fixed 
indicator of whether the hospital was ever exposed to entry.  Therefore we use a generalized version of the 
negative binomial regression and explicitly model the degree of over-dispersion.     
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physician occurs in tandem with his choice of a hospital.  Thus if exposed hospitals 
reduce the supply of uncontested services by limiting the privileges of specialists of the 
service then the expected utility of an admission to an exposed hospital will also be 
lowered relative to its competitors.  
  
This analysis enables us to estimate the degree of substitution that occurs between 
hospitals that are exposed and those that are not exposed.  We model the probability of an 
admission for an uncontested service using a logit demand framework.  The utility of 
patient i admitted to hospital h in time t for a diagnosis related to an uncontested service 
is:  
(2)   hitihhiihihihthiihhthit TXTTExposureTXExposureU   3211,,,  
 
where Exposureht is a dichotomous variable that measures whether incumbent hospital h 
is exposed to entry at time t; Thi is the approximate travel time from patient i’s 
residence’s zip code to hospital h. Xi is a column vector reflecting the patient 
characteristics and clinical attributes that affect demand for inpatient services; h  is a 
hospital fixed effect and θi.  The final term in (2), εhit, represents the personal and 
idiosyncratic component of patient i’s utility of admission to hospital h at time t.   
 
Under the logit demand assumption, the predicted probability of a patient with 
characteristics  Xi,Thi   of choosing a given hospital h from a set of G hospitals available 
at time t, is  
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(3)       


tGg
giiiggt
hiiihht
hiitht TXExposureU
TXExposureUTXGs
,,,,exp
,,,,exp
,, 

. 
 
The parameter associated with Exposureht measures the effect of entry in contested 
services on the probability a patient will be admitted to hospital h for an uncontested 
service.  Exposureht equals one if the hospital is exposed to entry and zero otherwise.  We 
use a discrete measure of exposure because the decision to change the supply of 
uncontested services would only occur if the shock to a system's profitability was 
sufficiently large.   
 
The specifications in Equations 2 and 3 are intentionally parsimonious. Hospital fixed 
effects control for service offerings that are fixed over the entire time period.  We do not 
control for specialty service offerings that vary over time because hospital administrators 
may add or drop these services in response to entry and the inclusion of these changes 
over time would yield inconsistent estimates of the exposure.  As a result our estimates 
capture all changes in specialty services offerings at more exposed hospitals relative to 
less exposed ones.             
 
We estimate Equation 3 using a conditional logit model.  We calculate robust standard 
errors with hospital-level clustering.  Our specification is analogous to a difference-in-
differences approach where the sample consists of admissions pre- and post- entry, the 
treatment is exposure to entry, and the outcome is the probability of an admission.  The 
control group consists of hospitals located in Colorado or those located in Phoenix or 
Tucson but not exposed to entry.   
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As discussed above, when a cardiac hospital enters a market it will likely scout out 
potential sites and choose a site that best suits its objective. The potential entrant will 
therefore choose a location that is attractive to both cardiologists and their patients. In 
this case, the estimated effect of entry on a hospital's admissions will be correlated with 
unobserved hospital characteristics such as quality or managerial approach.  If these 
characteristics are also correlated with the provision of uncontested services then the 
exposure of a hospital to entry may be correlated with the supply of uncontested services, 
thus making Exposureht potentially endogenous.   
 
We control for endogeneity using the two-stage method of residual inclusion because the 
main equation is nonlinear (Basu and Terza 2009).  We chose two sets of instruments that 
(1) measure demand characteristics that affect the appeal of a hospital's catchment area 
for a specialty hospital and (2) measure the susceptibility of incumbent hospitals’ profits 
to entry.  We posit that the instruments we selected predict the exposure of an incumbent 
hospital to entry while at the same time are uncorrelated with unmeasured factors that 
would lead to both increased exposure and a deterioration of uncontested service demand.  
The first set of instruments measures the expected demand for cardiac services in each 
incumbent hospital's catchment area.  Hospitals in market areas where there is a high 
demand for cardiac services and that draw patients from wealthier zip codes are more 
likely to face increased competition due to entry than other market areas, ceterus paribus.  
Conditional on hospital fixed effects, these instruments are unlikely to directly affect 
uncontested services.   
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The first set of instruments measure the total number of admissions in a hospitals 
catchment area that require cardiac catheterization, open heart surgery, or stent 
placements: 
(4)  


Z
z hz
d
ztd
ht DriveTime
AdmissionsCodeZipAdmissionsAreaCatchment
1 ,
  
     
where the superscript d indicates cardiac catheterization, open heart surgery, or stent 
placements; Zip Code Admissions is the number of admissions of residents in zip code z 
that require procedure d; and Drive Time is amount of time it takes to drive from zip code 
z to hospital h.  We also calculated a measure of the hospital catchment area income 
using Equation 4 by replacing Zip Code Admissions with zip code per capita income. 
Equation 4 assigns greater weight to admissions and income at zip codes that are more 
proximate to a hospital.  Large values reflect hospital catchment areas that are proximate 
to zip codes with a large number of patients with a given diagnosis or a higher income 
population.  A hospital on the fringe of a metro area might have relatively low values for 
the diagnosis measures because the drive time to the hospital from the population center 
is relatively long.  However, such a hospital may have a larger value on the income 
measure if the fringe of the metro area had higher average income than the population 
centers.   
 
To measure the supply of cardiac services at each incumbent hospital taking into account 
system membership, the second set of instruments measure the number of open heart 
surgery units and cardiac catheter laboratories operated by a system or an independent 
hospital at the beginning of our sample period (1997).  These variables measure the 
baseline susceptibility of the system's profits to competition in cardiac services.  We fix 
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the supply of these services to the 1997 level for two reasons.  First, systems may close or 
drop services in response to entry and a contemporaneous measure of supply would be 
endogenous in the first-stage equation.  Second, a potential entrant will choose among 
sites based on the expected supply of services at the time of entry.  Finally, we measure 
supply at the system level because even if a hospital that is proximate to a potential site 
does not offer a service locally, specialist physicians commonly have offices at multiple 
sites but will perform more complicated surgeries at a particular branch within a system.  
Patients are typically willing to travel further for surgery than for less complicated care.         
 
VI. Data 
Our primary dataset is the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient 
Database (SID), which consists of the inpatient discharge abstracts from all hospitals in 
Arizona and Colorado of all patients discharged between 1997-1998 and 2005-2007.   
The sample includes admissions to all non-federal general or cardiac specialty hospitals 
in the Phoenix, Tucson, and Colorado’s front range (including Boulder, Colorado 
Springs, and Denver) markets for contested and uncontested services.  Colorado borders 
Arizona to the northeast, and the front range of Colorado is similar to Phoenix and 
Tucson in a number of ways.  Both states have major population centers that are well 
delineated from surrounding areas.  The front range of Colorado is bordered by the 
Rocky Mountains to the west and semi-arid grasslands to the east.  Similarly, Phoenix 
and Tucson are surrounded by Sonoran Desert to the south and west and mountains to the 
north.  These markets have a comparable prevalence of large local and national systems, 
reflecting a similar hospital regulatory environments.  In addition, and perhaps most 
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importantly, while no regulatory restrictions to entry were in place in either state, there 
was no specialty cardiac hospital entry in Colorado during the time period of our sample.   
 
We limited the sample to a pre-period 1997-1998 and a three-year post-period 2005-2007 
in order to capture the long-run effects of the shock.  We expect there to be a lag between 
entry and the effect on hospital's profits.  Furthermore, there is likely to be a lag between 
reduced profitability and decisions regarding service offerings.  Tucson Heart Hospital 
opened Tucson in 1998 and Arizona Heart Hospital opened in Phoenix in 1999.  Both 
experienced rapid growth in 1999-2000 but the growth leveled off after 2000.  Banner 
Baywood Heart Hospital entered Mesa in 2001 and after two years of rapid growth its 
admissions stabilized after 2003.  Furthermore, likely in response to entry, the 
composition of systems changed between 2000-2003 as hospitals realigned services to 
adapt to the new market structure.   
 
Admissions to a contested service are defined as an admission in the Circulatory System 
Major Diagnostic Category (MDC 5).  We examine the following uncontested services:  
Psychiatry (MDC 19); Alcohol and Drug Treatment (MDC 20); and Trauma (MDC 24), 
all commonly considered to be unprofitable services (Horwitz, 2005; Vladeck 2006; 
Hseuh et al., 2009). We also estimate the model using a sample of neurosurgery 
discharges. In contrast to psychiatric, substance abuse, and trauma services, neurosurgery 
is thought to be a profitable service (Lindrooth et al. 2011). As neither market in Arizona 
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experienced entry into neurosurgery, we predict those incumbents most exposed to entry 
to raise, rather than reduce, the number of neurosurgery discharges.15  
 
We restrict the sample to persons who were treated within their state of residence. 
Emergency admissions are identified using the admission type associated with the 
discharge.  We do not distinguish between admissions from each payer because several 
hospitals did not consistently report payer type in the HCUP-SID data.  However, the 
majority of admissions for cardiac care are either Medicare or private.  Medicaid and 
self-pay admissions for cardiac care are relatively rare.  We include a dummy variable 
that indicates if the payer was an HMO to control for the fact that HMOs use selective 
contracting which could result in idiosyncratic differences in travel patterns for these 
patients.        
 
Travel times from the epicenter of each patient zip code to the address of the closest 
hospital-based service are calculated using data from Mapquest, Inc (Mapquest 2010). In 
the psychiatry sample we include the drive time to closest private specialty psychiatric 
hospital as a covariate to control for secular variation in access to substitutes to general 
hospital psychiatric admissions because the HCUP does not include discharges from 
specialty psychiatric hospitals. 
 
                                                 
15 This prediction relies on the assumption that hospitals chose their pre-entry mix of profitable services 
optimally and were operating at capacity. If entry by specialty cardiac hospitals reduced cardiac 
admissions, space and time would be freed up to provide other services that require similar facilities and 
personnel. 
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We link the SID files to data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey of 
Hospitals (AHA) to incorporate additional hospital covariates and merge in zip code level 
median income from the U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates.  System membership; 
the existence of a cardiac catheterization lab; and open heart surgery capability are also 
drawn from the AHA data.  The hospital covariates included in each specification are 
listed in Table 1.   
 
 
V. Results 
Table 2 shows the net income from patients and the number of admissions for hospitals in 
Arizona by the estimated degree of exposure.  The 25th percentile of exposure reflects 
hospitals in systems that experienced an estimated reduction of more than 786 admissions 
or for independent hospital a reduction of more than 416 hospital admissions.  The 
threshold for the 50th percentile is 665 system-level or 210 hospital-level admissions and 
the threshold for the 75th percentile is 263 system-level or 87 hospital-level admissions 
for system and independent hospitals respectively.  Overall, aggregate service offerings 
were unrelated to exposure.  However, hospitals without an impact were much more 
profitable in the post period than in the pre period. 
 
Trends in admissions for uncontested services are shown in Table 3 which includes the 
parameter estimates of an ordinary least squares regression of admissions on exposure 
and year and hospital fixed effects.  The constant reflects the average number of 
admissions for each service line in 1997.  Psychiatric admissions declined at exposed 
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hospitals relative to the control by about 18-50 admissions (or 15-50%) depending on the 
degree of exposure.   Trauma admissions were not significantly affected.  Admissions for 
substance abuse declined by 38-60 admissions at exposed hospitals or 60-100%.  
Admissions for neurology increased at exposed hospitals but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant.  Overall, admissions increased from 1997-2007, though they 
dipped in 2006 relative to 2007. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of a negative binomial regression of the number admissions 
using a state-level measure of exposure pre and post entry.  The coefficient estimates 
reveal a growth in the Arizona and Colorado markets of the number of psychiatric; 
trauma, and substance abuse admissions.  The increase was smaller in Arizona but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. 
    
Table 5 shows the marginal effects based on the coefficient estimates from a generalized 
negative binomial count data model of the number of admissions at the system level.  The 
estimates reflect the change in admissions related to exposure for three uncontested 
services: inpatient psychiatric services, trauma care, drug/substance abuse treatment. For 
each service we report coefficient estimates for three samples: systems above the top 25th 
percentile of exposure, systems above the top 50th percentile of exposure, and systems 
above the top 75th percentile of exposure. For each sample-service pair we report results 
with and without accounting for endogeneity.  
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The Shea partial R-squared from a linear probability model of the first stage ranges from 
0.168 and 0.452.  The Shea partial R-squared values for the hospital-level analysis are 
quite similar to those for the patient-level analysis.  The F-test statistics at the hospital 
level range from 2.42 to 13.48 in the first stage of the negative binomial regression.  
However, the F-test statistics are very large in the patient-level first stage used in the 
conditional logit specification.  Overall, the instruments are strong predictors of 
Exposureht in the patient-level analysis. 
 
For inpatient psychiatric services, hospitals more exposed systems had fewer yearly 
admissions post entry. The magnitude of the decrease ranges between 63.14 and 87.49 
fewer psychiatric admissions, depending on the percentile of exposure and specification. 
When accounting for endogeneity, the decrease in the number of yearly psychiatric 
admissions is similar (between 66.6 and 84.03). Similar results are obtained for trauma 
care and substance abuse treatment, although the results are often not statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates from the conditional logit model of the 
probability of admissions to a given hospital.  The estimates reflect the change in the 
probability/market share of the hospital that is related to exposure for the three 
uncontested services. Among the 25% most exposed hospitals the market share of 
admissions for psychiatric services declined by 17.6 percentage points.  The results are 
consistent with those presented in Table 3, and the reported estimates are statistically 
significant for all uncontested services. The likelihood of receiving care (for any of the 
three contested services) in hospitals that are part of exposed systems was significantly 
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lower. Since the first stage residual is, for the most part, statistically significant, we trust 
the estimates from regressions adjusting for endogeneity, which are generally smaller 
than the unadjusted ones.  As the definition of exposure was more inclusive, the estimates 
became smaller in magnitude.  At the 75th percentile the estimate for psychiatric services 
was small and statistically insignificant and the estimate for trauma services turned 
positive.   
  
Table 7 shows the results for admissions for neurosurgery.  The first set of results are the 
marginal effects from the hospital-level negative binomial regression model (analogous 
to Table 5) and the second set of results are the change in market shares from the 
conditional logit model (analogous to Table 6).  We find that hospitals exposed to entry 
in the top 25th percentile decreased their neurosurgery admissions though this result is 
marginally significant.  The decrease is smaller and the standard errors are larger when 
the 50th and 75th-percentile cutoffs are used.  This result is inconsistent with the trends in 
the linear fixed effect regression and the conditional logit analysis, where the probability 
of admission at hospitals above the top 25th , 50th and 75th percentile of exposure 
increased by 0.10 to about 0.20.  By shifting to other highly reimbursed services, 
hospitals allocate resources away from contested services to partially offset the loss of 
patient revenue. This strategy would mitigate the effect on cross-subsidization, but is 
unlikely to fully offset the loss of revenue caused by specialty entry. If it did, that would 
indicate that hospitals were not allocating resources efficiently in the pre-entry period. 
This results suggests that systems do adjust their service offering of uncontested services 
(both profitable and unprofitable), and that the results in tables 3 and 4 represent the 
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effect of entry that takes into account observed and unobserved adjustments made by 
hospital systems.  
 
VI. Discussion  
This is the first study to present systematic evidence of cross-subsidization of 
unprofitable service lines by using a shock to a profitable service line. We show that 
hospital systems adjusted their uncontested service offerings in the face of entry by 
single-specialty competitors. Consistent with cross-subsidization, reductions in the 
volume of psychiatric, substance abuse, and trauma care were greater among hospital 
systems most exposed to a potential loss in volume of their cardiac services.  
 
We also find that the market share of neurosurgeries increased at exposed hospitals. 
though we do not find evidence that the total number of surgeries increased.  These 
systems may have siphoned off neurosurgery admissions from less exposed systems or 
adjacent geographic regions. Alternatively, they may have succeeded in encouraging 
marginal patients who would have delayed or refused surgery otherwise to undergo the 
procedure. This suggests that systems unable to replace lost revenue from cardiac care 
with new revenue from neurosurgery volume may come under even greater pressure to 
reduce unprofitable services.  
  
We focused on cross-subsidization across service lines, but there are several other 
mechanisms to support the provision of unprofitable care, regardless of a patients 
diagnosis. Governments provide special funding to hospitals treating a disproportionate 
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fraction of low-income and uninsured patients through the Disproportionate Share 
Hospital (DSH) programs at the federal level and direct transfers at the state and local 
level (Duggan, 2000).  An increasingly popular approach used in several states is to 
cross-subsidize unprofitable care across hospital systems using uncompensated care pools 
(Anderson et al., 2009; Bovbjerg et al., 2000). The transfers related to DSH payments and 
uncompensated care pools lessen the cost of cross subsidizing unprofitable services lines 
but we find that indirect subsidies alone are not sufficient to eliminate it.  As specialty 
hospitals aim to treat well-insured patients, they are unlikely to affect either the DSH 
payments received by incumbent hospitals or the size of the uncompensated care pool.  
 
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for communities to bail out hospitals that are considered 
to provide community benefits in order to prevent bankruptcy and closure (Capps, et al., 
2010).  Such subsidies are more likely if a hospital provides unprofitable services that are 
in short supply.  Sole providers of unprofitable services in a community may be in a 
position to extract a subsidy from local governments in order to keep a service line 
open.16    
 
There is an extensive literature on cross-subsidization in the context of privately owned 
regulated firms (Faulhaber, 1975; Peltzman, 1976; Nicolas 1991; Chevalier, 2004). 
Regulation of the transportation and telecommunications industries has broadly consisted 
of requirements for providing some services below average cost while using entry 
                                                 
16 Similarly, nonprofit hospitals receive tax exemptions and can use the retained tax payments for this 
purpose, and a number of states have introduced explicit charity care mandates (Ginn and Moseley 2006; 
Nobel et al., 1998). Additionally, nonprofit hospitals may rely on unrelated business activity (Riley, 2007) 
and donations (Okten and Weisbrod, 2000; Leone and Van-Horn, 2005) to finance uncompensated care. 
While incumbent hospitals might react to entry by declaring bankruptcy or switching their ownership type. 
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restrictions to allow excess rents on other services. Airlines cross-subsidized lower-
density traffic with profits from higher-density traffic, while railroads (prior to the 
creation of Amtrak in 1971) cross-subsidized unprofitable passenger services with profits 
from freight (Banks et al., 1999). In telecommunications, profits from long-distance 
services were used to subsidize local services (Nicolas, 1991). Over-time these 
regulations produced inefficient outcomes that eventually led to the deregulation of these 
industries (Peltzman, 1989; Banks et al., 1999). 
 
Evidence of cross-subsidization by general hospitals does not mean, however, that this is 
an efficient way to achieve social goals such as supporting access to services or serving 
indigent patients (David and Helmchen 2006, Capps et al., 2010, Capps et al., 2011; 
Lindrooth et al., 2003).  It may be advisable to preserve activities deemed socially vital, 
as opposed to preserving the mechanisms set forth to finance such activities.  Our 
findings corroborate the conjecture that hospitals adjust downward their offerings of 
arguably unprofitable services in response to an adverse shock to services considered to 
be profitable enough to encourage entry by single-specialty hospitals. In light of these 
findings, a comprehensive welfare analysis of entry by single-specialty hospitals should 
include not only its market-wide effects on contested services but also consider its 
market-wide effects on uncontested services which rely on general hospitals’ cross-
subsidization efforts. 
 - 32 -
References 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [AHRQ] (2006). Introduction to the HCUP 
State Inpatient Databases (SID). 
 
Al-Amin, Mona, Jacqueline Zinn, Michael D. Rosko, and William Aaronson, “Specialty 
Hospital Market Proliferation: Strategic Implications for General Hospitals”, Health Care 
management Review, 2010, Vol. 35(4), pp 294-300. 
 
American Hospital Association (various).  Annual Survey of Hospitals database. 
 
Anderson R, Cunningham P, Hofmann P, Lerner W, Seitz K, McPherson B, “Dialogue: 
Protecting the Hospital Safety Net”, Inquiry, 2009, Vol. 46: pp. 7–16. 
 
Banks, A. Dwayne, Stephen Foreman, and Theodore Keeler. "Cross-subsidization in 
Hospital Care: Some Lessons from the Law and Economics of Regulation." Health 
Matrix, 1999. Vol 9(1) ,pp1-35. 
 
Banks, A. Dwayne, Wendel and Paterson, “Uncompensated Hospital Care: Charitable 
Mission or Profitable Business Decision?”, Health Economics, 1997 
 
Barro J.R., Huckman R.S., and Kessler D.P. (2005). “The effects of cardiac specialty 
hospitals on the cost and quality of medical care,” Journal of Health Economics. 
 
Bazzoli, G.J., B. Chan, S.M. Shortell, and T. D'Aunno. 2000. The Financial Performance 
of Hospitals Belonging to Health Networks and Systems. Inquiry 37(3):234–52.  
 
Berenson RA, Ginsburg PB, and May JH. (2006) Hospital-Physician Relations: 
Cooperation, Competition, or Separation? Health Affairs 
 
Berenson, Robert, Gloria Bazzoli, and Melanie Au. "Do Specialty Hospitals Promote 
Price Competition?" Health System Change. Jan. 2006. 
 
Bertrand M., Duflo E. and, Mullainathan S. (2004).  “How much should we trust 
differences-in-differences estimates?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004 Feb; 
119(1):249-275. 
 
Bovbjerg, R. R., A. E. Cuellar, et al. (2000). Market Competition and Uncompensated 
Care Pools, The Urban Institute. 
 
Brennan, J.Timothy, “Cross-subsidization and cost misallocation by regulated 
monopolists”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1990, Volume 2, Number 1, 37-51 
 
Buchmueller T.C., Jacobson M., and Wold C. (2006).  “How far to the hospital? The 
effect of hospital closures on access to care,” Journal of Health Economics. 
 
 - 33 -
Burns L.R., Walston, S.L., Alexander, J., Zuckerman, H., Andersen, R., & Torrens, P. 
(2001). Just how integrated are integrated delivery systems? Results from a national 
survey. Health Care Management Review, 26(1), 22-41. 
 
Burns R. Lawton, Guy David and Lorens A. Helmchen. (2011). “Strategic Response by 
Providers to Specialty Hospitals, Ambulatory Surgery Centers, and Retail Clinics.” 
Population Health Management, 14(2), 69-77. 
 
Burns, L.R., Alexander, J., Shortell, S.M., et al. (2001). Physician commitment to 
organized delivery systems. Medical Care, 39(7; Suppl.), I 9-29. 
 
Capps C, Carlton D, and David G. “Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals 
Receive Special Care?” working paper, 2011.  
 
Capps C, Dranove D, and Satterthwaite M. Competition and market power in option 
demand markets. Rand Journal of Economics 2003; 34; 737–63. 
 
Capps C, Dranove D, and Lindrooth, R. Hospital closure and economic efficiency. 
Journal of Health Economics , 2010; 29(1); 87-109. 
 
Casalino L.P., Devers K.J., and Brewster L.R. (2003). “Focused factories? Physician-
owned specialty facilities,” Health Affairs, 22(6):56-67, 2003 Nov-Dec. 
 
Cassil, Alwyn. "General Hospitals, Speciality Hospitals and Financially Vulnerable 
Patients." Health System Change. 23 Apr. 2009. 
 
Chernew M. Gowrisankaran G, Fendrick M. Payer type and the returns to bypass surgery: 
evidence from hospital entry behavior. Journal of Health Economics 2002; 21; 451–74.  
 
Chevalier, Judith (2004) "What Do We Know About Cross-subsidization? Evidence from 
Merging Firms." Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 4 : Issue. 1, Article 3. 
 
Cram P., Rosenthal G.E., and Vaughan-Sarrazin M.S. (2005).  “Cardiac revascularization 
in specialty and general hospitals,” New England Journal of Medicine, 2005 Apr 7; 
352(14):1454-62. 
 
Cromwell, J., Adamache W., Bernard S., Greenwald L., Drozd E., Root E., Kane N., and 
Devers K. (2005). Specialty Hospital Evaluation, Final Report to the CMS. Waltham, 
Mass.: RTI, September 2005. 
 
Dafny, L.S. (2005). "Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterance in Hospital Procedure 
Markets."  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 14(3): 513-542. 
     
David G. and Helmchen L. (2006). “An Uncertain Prescription – Are tax exemptions for 
nonprofit hospitals an efficient way to fund indigent care?” Regulation 29 (2): 14-16. 
 
 - 34 -
Dobson, Allen. and Haught Randall. (2005). “The Rise of the Entrepreneurial Physician” 
Health Affairs. 
 
Dubbs, N., G.J. Bazzoli, S.M. Shortell, and P. Kralovec. 2004. Reexamining 
Organizational Configurations: An Update, Validation, and Expansion of the Taxonomy 
of Health Networks and Systems. Health Services Research 39(1):207–20.  
 
Duggan, Mark. (2000). “Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 4, pp. 1343-1373. 
 
Faulhaber, R. Gerald, “Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises”, American 
Economic Review, Dec 1975, Vol. 65(5), pp 966-977. 
 
Fournier, G. M. and E. S. Campbell (1997). Indigent Care as Quid Pro Quo in Hospital 
Regulation. 79: 669-673. 
 
Ginn, G. O. and C. B. Moseley (2006). "The impact of state community benefit laws on 
the community health orientation and health promotion services of hospitals." Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law 31(2): 321-44. 
 
Greenwald L., Cromwell J., Adamache W., Bernard S., Drozd E., Root E., and Devers K 
(2006).  “Specialty versus community hospitals: referrals, quality, and community 
benefits,” Health Affairs, 25(1):106-18, 2006 Jan-Feb. 
 
Guimarães, Paulo, and Octávio Figueirdo & Douglas Woodward, 2003. "A Tractable 
Approach to the Firm Location Decision Problem," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 201-204, 01 
 
Guterman, Stuart (2006) “Specialty Hospitals: A Problem Or A Symptom?” Health 
Affairs; 25(1): p95, 2006 Jan-Feb. 
 
Hadley J. and Zuckerman S. (2005).  “Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals: A Market 
Signal For Medicare Payment Revisions,” Health Affairs (web exclusive). W5:491-493, 
2005 Oct 25. 
 
Horwitz J.R. (2005). “Making profits and providing care: comparing nonprofit, for-profit, 
and government hospitals,” Health Affairs, 24(3):790-801, 2005 May-Jun. 
 
Hseuh-Fen Chen, Bazzoli, J. Gloria, and Hui-Min Hsieh, “Hospital Financial Conditions 
and the Provision of Unprofitable Services”, Atlantic Economic Journal, 2009, Vol. 37, 
pp 259-277. 
 
Iglehart, J.K. (2005). “The emergence of physician-owned specialty hospitals,” New 
England Journal of Medicine, 2005 Jan 6; 352(1):78-84.   
 
 - 35 -
Leone A.J. , R.L. Van Horn, “How do nonprofit hospitals manage earnings?” Journal of 
Health Economics 24 (2005) 815–837 
 
Lindrooth R, Lo Sasso A, Bazzoli G. The effect of urban hospital closure on markets. 
Journal of Health Economics 2003; 22(5); 691–712. 
 
Lindrooth R, Konetzka T, Zhu J, Wei M, Volpp K. "The effect of the generosity of 
reimbursement on hospital quality."  Working paper 2011 
 
Mapquest. 2010. Directions. Denver, CO:  MapQuest, Inc.2010 [accessed February 18, 
2010] Available at http://www.mapquest.com/directions  
McClellan, M.B. (2005).  Specialty Hospitals: Assessing their Role in the Delivery of 
Quality Health Care, Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
May 12, 2005 
 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (2005). Report to the Congress: Physician-
Owned Specialty Hospitals. Washington, D.C.: March 2005. 
 
Mitchell J.M. (2005). “Effects of Physician-Owned Limited-Service Hospitals: Evidence 
from Arizona,” Health Affairs (web exclusive). W5:481-490, 2005 Oct 25. 
 
Nicholson, Sean, Mark V. Pauly, Lawton R. Burns, Agnieshka Baumritter, and David A. 
Asch (2000). “Measuring Community Benefits Provided by For-Profit and Nonprofit 
Hospitals,” Health Affairs 2000; November/December: 168-177. 
 
Nicolas, Curien, “The theory and measure of cross-subsidies: an application to the 
telecommunications industy” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1991, Vol 
9, pp 73-108. 
 
Noble, A., A., A. Hyams, L., et al. (1998). "Charitable hospital accountability: A review 
and analysis of legal and policy initiatives." The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
26(2): 116. 
 
Norton, C. Edward and Staiger, O. Douglas, “How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to 
Care for thre Uninsured” Rand Economic Journal, 1994. 
 
Okten, Cagla and Burton A. Weisbrod,  “Determinants of donations in private nonprofit 
markets”, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 75, Issue 2, February 2000, Pages 255-
272. 
 
Peltzman Sam “Towads a More General Theory of Regulation” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 1976 
 
Peltzman, S. P. (1989). "The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of 
Deregulation." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1989: 1-59. 
 
 - 36 -
Phelps, E. Charles, “Cross-Subsidies and Charge-Shifting in American Hospitals” in 
Frank A. Sloan et al., editors  Uncompensated Health Care: Rights and Responsibilities, 
1986, pp 108-125. 
 
Riley, M., “Unrelated Business Income Tax Returns, 2003: Financial Highlights and a 
Special Analysis of a Nonprofit Charitable Organization’s Revenue and Taxable 
Income,” Statistics of Income Bulletin, 26, 88–115. 
 
Salkever, D. S. (2000). Regulation of Prices and Investment in Hospitals in the United 
States. Handbook of Health Economics. A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse, Elsevier 
Science. 1: 1490-1532. 
 
Schactman, David. "Specialty Hospitals, Ambulatory Surgery Centers, And General 
Hospitals: Charting A Wise Public Policy Course -- Shactman 24 (3): 868." Health 
Affairs. 2005. 
 
Schneider, John, Robert Ohsfeldt, Michael Morrisey, Bennet Zelner, and Thomas Miller. 
"Economic and Policy Analysis of Specialty Hospitals." Health Economics Consulting 
Group. Feb. 2005. 
 
Shneider, John, Robert Ohsfeldt, Michael Morrisey, Pengxiang Li, Thomas Miller, and 
Bennet Zelner. "Effects of Specialty Hospitals on the Financial Performance of General 
Hospitals." Excellus Health Plan. 2007. Inquiry Journal. 
 
Shneider, John, Thomas Miller, Robert Ohsfeldt, Michael Morrisey, Bennet Zelner, and 
Pengxiang Li. "The Economics of Specialty Hospitals." Medical Care Research and 
Review. 2 June 2008. Sage Publications. 
 
Sinitsyn, Maxim and Burton A. Weisbrod, “Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations in For-
Profit Markets: The Curious Case of Unprofitable Revenue-Raising Activities”, Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, vol. 164, issue 4, pages 727-
750. 
 
Steinbuch, Robert. "Healthy Competition: Getting the Best Hospital Care for Patients." 
Medical - Legal Sidebar. June 2010. Journal of the National Medical Association. 
 
Stensland, J. and Winter, A. (2006). “Do physician-owned cardiac hospitals increase 
utilization?” Health Affairs, 25(1):119-29, 2006 Jan-Feb. 
 
Tynan, Ann, Elizabeth November, and Johanna Lauer. "General Hospitals, Specialty 
Hospitals and Financially Vulnerable Patients." Center for Studying Health Change. Apr. 
2009. 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2003). Specialty hospitals: geographic location, 
services provided, and financial performance. Washington, D.C.: October 2003: 1-41. 
(GAO-04-167.) 
 
Vladeck, C. Bruce, “Paying For Hospitals’ Community Service”, Health Affairs, 2006, 
Vol. 25(1), pp 34-43. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Sample: Psychiatric  Trauma Substance Abuse Neurosurgery 
Patient Characteristics 
Emergency Admission 39.50% 67.30% 58.70% 22.60% 
HMO Primary Payer 17.7% 22.5% 20.9% 31.8% 
Age 50-74 22.10% 28.60% 28.60% 48.20% 
Age >74 12.70% 11.50% 4.68% 24.80% 
Ln(Drive Time) 2.652 2.644 3.391 3.378 
 (0.751) (0.885) (0.767) (0.738) 
# Procedures 0.269 1.561 0.659 2.592 
 (0.724) (1.981) (0.860) (1.665) 
# Diagnoses 4.971 6.127 5.718 5.420 
 (2.327) (2.099) (2.108) (2.383) 
Ln(Drive Time)  interacted with:     
  Age 50-74 0.588 0.773 0.973 1.639 
 (1.165) (1.310) (1.591) (1.773) 
  Age >74 0.326 0.286 0.163 0.838 
 (0.899) (0.853) (0.753) (1.506) 
  HMO Primary Payer 0.476 0.591 0.713 1.070 
 (1.076) (1.164) (1.428) (1.600) 
  # Procedures 0.702 4.396 2.210 8.740 
 (2.027) (6.196) (2.974) (6.074) 
  # Diagnoses 13.11 16.16 19.30 18.29 
 (7.317) (7.972) (8.346) (9.122) 
Admissions 51,803 48,652 16,897 25,113 
Hospital Characteristics (Weighted by Hospital Admissions) 
Phoenix 49.50% 59.00% 53.80% 60.10% 
Tucson 17.90% 18.00% 17.30% 16.00% 
System Exposure Top Quartile 7.14% 10.90% 6.94% 10.60% 
System Exposure Median 14.80% 20.90% 15.00% 20.20% 
System Exposure Top 3 
Quartiles 23.50% 29.30% 26.00% 31.90% 
Partial Year Data   0.42% 0.58% 0.53% 
For-profit 24.00% 33.10% 20.80% 32.40% 
Teaching 12.80% 10.50% 14.50% 13.30% 
 
Psychiatric 
Unit  Trauma Unit 
Substance Abuse 
Unit  
Specialty Service Offerings: 
Hospital 66.80% 64.40% 23.10% N/A 
Specialty Service Offerings: 
System 44.40% 53.60% 22.50% N/A 
Hospital Years 196 239 173 188 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Net Income from Patients and Admissions for Arizona Hospital Systems Before and After Entry, by Exposure 
  No Exposure Top 25th Percentile Top 50th Percentile Top 75th Percentile 
 Pre  Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Net Income from Patients 
(Median)  $768,151 $3,110,139 $312,606 -$680,824 -$576,530 -$329,053 -$759,803 -$477,308 
Psychiatric Admissions 114.23 (109.44) 
157.08 
(174.59) 
65.00 
(38.12) 
73.07 
(69.55) 
114.46 
(107.77) 
115.95 
(138.58) 
99.68 
(97.70) 
127.07 
(143.60) 
Trauma Admissions 111.75 (120.40) 
170.78 
(186.34) 
152.65 
(122.03) 
178.30 
(165.28) 
165.19 
(129.86) 
188.50 
(173.41) 
152.54 
(122.54) 
190.61 
(162.77) 
Substance Abuse Admissions 53.53 (46.33) 
96.26 
(92.90) 
68.13 
(91.89) 
46.63 
(22.07) 
72.88 
(78.83) 
63.56 
(48.68) 
57.97 
(68.76) 
63.00 
(45.80) 
Neurosurgery Admissions 104.60     (61.36) 
111.56   
(72.35) 
  126.42    
 (155.40) 
151.42  
(278.39) 
123.34 
(134.78) 
143.17   
(241.60) 
  117.57 
 (122.43) 
144.81 
(213.47) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Fixed Effect Analysis of Number of Admissions, by diagnosis   
  Psychiatric Trauma Substance Abuse Neurosurgery 
     
Top 25th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 786 system-level or 416 hospital admissions)   
Exposure -39.29* -15.00 -59.46*** 10.86 
 (22.70) (13.05) (14.40) (16.13) 
1998 7.889 0.766 6.176 6.405 
 (14.45) (8.931) (9.458) (11.58) 
2005 64.01*** 62.33*** 48.61*** 30.76** 
 (15.80) (9.716) (10.00) (12.83) 
2006 59.82*** 65.98*** 46.38*** 26.64** 
 (15.95) (9.775) (10.00) (12.97) 
2007 30.11* 36.57*** 28.15*** -5.363 
 (15.95) (9.919) (10.10) (12.97) 
Constant 101.7*** 131.9*** 52.04*** 109.7*** 
 (10.39) (6.387) (6.701) (8.231) 
     
Top 50th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 665 system-level or 210 hospital admissions) 
Exposure -50.66** -7.437 -51.80*** 4.372 
 (19.96) (11.85) (12.67) (14.98) 
1998 8.007 0.766 6.176 6.405 
 (14.29) (8.953) (9.469) (11.60) 
2005 72.11*** 60.79*** 52.84*** 32.44** 
 (16.21) (10.02) (10.42) (13.43) 
2006 65.40*** 64.11*** 47.66*** 28.59** 
 (15.95) (9.878) (10.14) (13.19) 
2007 35.69** 34.82*** 29.42*** -3.407 
 (15.95) (10.13) (10.23) (13.19) 
Constant 101.6*** 132.0*** 52.00*** 109.6*** 
 (10.27) (6.405) (6.708) (8.242) 
     
Top 75th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 263 system-level or 87 hospital admissions) 
Exposure -18.47 1.894 -38.70*** 18.04 
 (19.04) (11.45) (12.10) (14.85) 
1998 7.871 0.766 6.176 6.405 
 (14.55) (8.962) (9.682) (11.54) 
2005 63.90*** 56.98*** 55.07*** 23.37 
 (17.77) (10.85) (11.56) (14.72) 
2006 58.41*** 60.67*** 50.63*** 20.45 
 (17.28) (10.59) (11.20) (14.26) 
2007 28.70* 31.10*** 32.44*** -11.55 
 (17.28) (10.88) (11.31) (14.26) 
Constant 101.7*** 131.8*** 51.96*** 109.8*** 
Hospital-Years 196 239 172 183 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control for Hospital Fixed Effects;  Sample 1997-1998 & 2005-2007   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of the Market-Level Effect of Entry on Admissions, by 
Diagnosis 
  
  Psychiatric Trauma Substance Abuse Neurosurgery 
Post-Entry 0.742*** 0.315*** 0.683*** 0.123 
 (0.214) (0.0794) (0.215) (0.119) 
Arizona*Post-Entry -0.386 -0.00218 -0.217 -0.0711 
  (0.260) (0.0968) (0.260) (0.159) 
Constant 6.366*** 5.461*** 5.492*** 5.105*** 
 (0.240) (0.0922) (0.298) (0.136) 
Observations 196 239 172 183 
Robust standard errors with hospital level clustering in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control for Hospital Fixed Effects;  Sample 1997-1998 & 2005-2007   
 
 
Table 5. Marginal Effects of Negative Binomial Regression of Number of Admissions, by Exposure 
and Diagnosis 
Variables 
Psychiatric Services  Trauma Care  Substance Abuse  
            
  Endogenous   Endogenous   Endogenous 
Top 25th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 786 system-level or 416 hospital admissions)   
 -43.72* -38.24 -13.92 -1.380 -24.31 -24.70 
  (25.08) (24.85) (8.700) (9.010) (19.18) (19.95) 
Top 50th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 665 system-level or 210 hospital admissions) 
 -111.2*** -102.5*** -32.08** -18.35 -44.04** -39.03* 
  (36.67) (35.98) (14.41) (12.01) (21.97) (23.48) 
Top 75th percent of exposure (Reduction of more than 263 system-level or 87 hospital admissions) 
 -91.59*** -98.30*** -12.83 4.457 -32.27* -27.05 
  (31.29) (33.51) (13.68) (11.93) (18.19) (17.02) 
Controls for Hospital Fixed Effects, Year, % Emergency Admissions and other hospital characteristics.   
Robust standard errors with hospital clustering in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table 6.  Effect of Entry on Market Share, by Exposure Level and Diagnosis 
Exposure to Entry 
Psychiatric Services  Trauma Care  Drug / Substance Abuse  
            
  Endogenous   Endogenous   Endogenous 
Top 25th percentile -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.157*** -0.110*** -1.277*** -1.291*** 
(0.0351) (0.0357) (0.0250) (0.0270) (0.0519) (0.0530) 
Residual  0.0281  0.220***  -0.282 
   (0.0563)  (0.0525)  (0.197) 
Top 50th percentile -0.337*** -0.343*** -0.117*** -0.0454* -0.938*** -0.905*** 
(0.0241) (0.0260) (0.0233) (0.0252) (0.0439) (0.0441) 
Residual  -0.0311  0.355***  0.648*** 
   (0.0591)  (0.0552)  (0.129) 
Top 75th percentile  -0.244*** -0.0273 -0.0377 0.310*** -0.682*** -0.631*** 
(0.0231) (0.0318) (0.0245) (0.0342) (0.0424) (0.0423) 
Residual  0.969***  1.154***  1.270*** 
   (0.0970)  (0.0813)  (0.159) 
Controls for Drive Time interacted with: Hospital Fixed Effects and Patient characteristics in Table 1; Year, 
and whether the hospital reported partial year of data.  
Robust standard errors with patient clustering are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table 7.  Analysis of Neurosurgery Admissions           
  
Number of Admissions 
(Marginal Effects from Negative 
Binomial) 
Probability of Admission 
(Market Share from Conditional Logit Model) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    Endogenous   Endogenous 
Top 25th 
percentile 
-43.36** -40.98** 0.123*** 0.112*** 
(20.87) (18.47) (0.0333) (0.0335) 
Top 50th percentile of exposure 
 Number of Admissions Probability of Admission 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Endogenous  Endogenous 
Top 50th 
percentile 
-40.26** -40.16*** 0.0963*** 0.133*** 
(17.82) (15.35) (0.0305) (0.0315) 
Top 75th percentile of exposure 
 Number of Admissions Probability of Admission 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Endogenous  Endogenous 
Top 75th 
percentile  
-10.92 -24.56 0.226*** 0.228*** 
(18.40) (22.20) (0.0351) (0.0352) 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
NOTE: there are no hospital systems in Tuscon are in the top 25% of exposure 
 
 
Table A1.  Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions      
  Market: Phoenix Tucson Denver 
 Service: Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical 
              
Teaching Hospital 0.483*** 1.101*** -1.298*** -1.038*** 0.557** -0.0962 
  (0.0334) (0.0293) (0.0548) (0.0447) (0.268) (0.283) 
Cardiac Catheterization  0.488*** -0.483*** 0.468* 0.118** -1.774*** -0.325*** 
  (0.0367) (0.0216) (0.263) (0.0574) (0.0921) (0.0497) 
Open-heart Surgery 0.839*** 0.823*** 1.097*** 1.080*** 1.890*** 0.572*** 
  (0.0250) (0.0170) (0.0940) (0.0503) (0.0869) (0.0476) 
Ln(Drive Time) -1.063*** -1.500*** -0.0256 -0.504*** -1.121*** -0.997*** 
    (0.0331) (0.0231) (0.0788) (0.0441) (0.0993) (0.0762) 
Ln(Drive Time) interacted with:      
 Emergency Admission -0.941*** -0.824*** -0.875*** -0.517*** -0.425*** 0.0167 
  (0.0125) (0.00946) (0.0295) (0.0178) (0.0420) (0.0299) 
 Median Income -1.14e-05*** -9.68e-06*** -2.34e-05*** -2.70e-05*** -2.31e-05*** -3.21e-05*** 
  (4.86e-07) (3.74e-07) (1.25e-06) (8.50e-07) (1.56e-06) (1.31e-06) 
 Age 50-74 -0.184*** -0.166*** -0.0715 -0.0765*** -0.319*** -0.167*** 
  (0.0175) (0.0131) (0.0451) (0.0263) (0.0460) (0.0388) 
 Age >=75 -0.314*** -0.323*** -0.192*** -0.155*** -0.466*** -0.216*** 
  (0.0194) (0.0137) (0.0495) (0.0268) (0.0586) (0.0435) 
 # Procedures -0.0418*** 0.0973*** -0.279*** -0.0632*** 0.175*** 0.494*** 
  (0.00322) (0.00249) (0.0340) (0.0201) (0.0396) (0.0336) 
 # Diagnoses 0.0185*** 0.0167*** 0.0320*** 0.162*** -0.0168** 0.100*** 
  (0.00253) (0.00191) (0.00798) (0.00461) (0.00700) (0.00585) 
 HMO Payer -0.0688*** 0.00490 -0.0168*** 0.0134*** 0.00784 -0.0323*** 
    (0.0122) (0.00942) (0.00636) (0.00351) (0.00806) (0.00619) 
 
Table A1.  Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions (continued)      
  Market: Phoenix Tuscon Denver 
 Service: Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical 
Patient Diagnosis-Hospital Service Offerings Interactions     
Cardiac Catheterization  1.049***  3.343***  -0.127*  
  (0.0520)  (1.039)  (0.0749)  
Stent*Open Heart Surgery 0.611***  0.884***  0.397***  
  (0.0240)  (0.0733)  (0.147)  
Open Heart Surgery 1.830***  0.961***  0.0753  
  (0.0336)  (0.0847)  (0.0613)  
Patient Diagnosis-System Service Offerings Interactions     
Cardiac Catheterization  0.0265***  0.0225*  -0.0626***  
  (0.00457)  (0.0132)  (0.0104)  
Stent*Open Heart Surgery -0.0317***  0.0374**  -0.0838***  
  (0.00492)  (0.0154)  (0.0233)  
Open Heart Surgery 0.0141***  -0.341***  -0.00977  
    (0.00545)   (0.0191)   (0.0216)   
Hospital Fixed Effects * Ln(Drive Time)      
Hospital 2 -0.0102* -0.0646*** -0.0243*** -0.194*** -0.375*** -0.273*** 
  (0.00605) (0.00554) (0.00645) (0.00553) (0.0146) (0.0117) 
Hospital 3 -0.102*** -0.0529*** -0.0210 0.0254 -0.218*** -0.393*** 
  (0.00862) (0.00691) (0.0266) (0.0161) (0.0145) (0.0164) 
Hospital 4 0.221*** 0.0211*** -1.625*** -1.462*** -0.0466*** -0.186*** 
  (0.00607) (0.00543) (0.0799) (0.0830) (0.0121) (0.0120) 
Hospital 5 -0.281*** 0.103*** -0.240*** -0.431*** -0.193*** -0.254*** 
  (0.0193) (0.00801) (0.00788) (0.0233) (0.0138) (0.0133) 
Hospital 6 0.104*** 0.0244*** -0.189*** -0.145*** 0.0750*** -0.935*** 
  (0.00624) (0.00621) (0.00741) (0.0158) (0.00941) (0.0301) 
Hospital 7 -0.225*** -0.164*** -0.0919*** -0.192*** -0.338*** 0.0215*** 
  (0.00956) (0.00793) (0.0307) (0.0195) (0.0152) (0.00701) 
 
Table A1.  Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions (continued)      
  Market: Phoenix Tuscon Denver 
 Service: Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical 
Hospital Fixed Effects * Ln(Drive Time)      
Hospital 8 -0.0756*** -0.116*** 0.272*** -0.208*** -0.221*** -0.401*** 
 
  (0.00790) (0.00658) (0.0154) (0.00555) (0.0140) (0.0151) 
Hospital 9 -0.310*** -0.0319*** -0.112*** -0.00896** -0.216*** -0.286*** 
  (0.0108) (0.00676) (0.00614) (0.00454) (0.0124) (0.0128) 
Hospital 10 -0.00463 0.0541***  -0.131*** -0.287*** -0.264*** 
  (0.00738) (0.0116)  (0.0192) (0.0139) (0.0119) 
Hospital 11 0.0363*** -0.206***  0.194*** -0.259*** -0.318*** 
  (0.00854) (0.00727)  (0.0140) (0.0619) (0.0133) 
Hospital 12 0.0687*** -0.181***  -0.0967*** -0.327*** -0.164** 
  (0.0143) (0.00730)  (0.00501) (0.0167) (0.0664) 
Hospital 13 -0.261*** -0.295***  -0.308*** 0.0866*** -0.346*** 
  (0.00820) (0.0152)  (0.0220) (0.0109) (0.0144) 
Hospital 14 0.222*** -0.0570***   -0.400*** 0.0753*** 
  (0.00693) (0.00813)   (0.0185) (0.00965) 
Hospital 15 0.117*** -0.153***   -0.830*** -0.267*** 
  (0.0103) (0.0109)   (0.0434) (0.0138) 
Hospital 16 -0.122*** -0.315***    -0.544*** 
  (0.00747) (0.00712)    (0.0203) 
Hospital 17 -0.151*** 0.0176**     
  (0.0160) (0.00683)     
Hospital 18 -0.0162 -0.154***     
  (0.0121) (0.00997)     
Hospital 19 0.125*** -0.115***     
  (0.00777) (0.00609)     
Hospital 20 -0.243*** -0.328***     
  (0.0124) (0.0128)     
 
Table A1.  Results of Conditional Logit Analysis Cardiac Admissions (continued)      
  Market: Phoenix Tuscon Denver 
 Service: Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical Surgical  Medical 
Hospital Fixed Effects * Ln(Drive Time)      
Hospital 21 0.0110 -0.00662     
  (0.00733) (0.00880)     
Hospital 22 -0.287*** -0.350***     
  (0.0162) (0.00853)     
Hospital 23 -0.307*** -0.438***     
  (0.0174) (0.0111)     
Hospital 24 -0.256*** -0.224***     
  (0.00807) (0.00731)     
Hospital 25 -0.0553*** -0.224***     
  (0.00707) (0.0105)     
Hospital 26 0.0194*** -0.157***     
  (0.00667) (0.0103)     
Hospital 27 -0.530*** -0.250***     
  (0.0324) (0.00655)     
Hospital 28 -0.00371 -0.0398***     
  (0.00668) (0.00573)     
Hospital 29 -0.309*** 0.00656     
  (0.0180) (0.00519)     
Hospital 30  -0.313***     
   (0.00990)     
Hospital 31  0.00817     
   (0.00548)     
Hospital 32  -0.112***     
   (0.0102)     
        
Observations 2234621 2376325 195349 415210 332565 341968 
Standard errors in parentheses   
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
